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Working Paper Number 108 
 
Do PRSPs empower poor countries and disempower the World 
Bank, or is it the other way round? 
 




Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have been introduced by the World Bank 
and the IMF as a necessary aspect of securing HIPC debt relief and access to other 
funds. They are intended to increase national 'ownership' of programmes, through 
extensive participation. This paper assesses whether they actually do empower poor 
countries, by exploring the process and content of the PRSPs. It finds that as far as 
civil society is concerned, the PRSPs currently permit little significant contribution to 
programme design. Governments appear to take a bigger role, but are also heavily 
constrained, especially with respect to macro-policy. The fact that the content of 
PRSPs is very similar to previous adjustment packages suggest that little real change 
has occurred through this process. Moreover, some large IFI programmes are 
unaffected by the process. Hence PRSPs do not significantly empower poor countries. 
They may give the appearance of greater ownership, but so long as there is no 
significant underlying change, such a change in perceptions about ownership, which 
could make IFI designed programmes more effective and thereby empower them, is 











Policy reforms imposed on developing countries through conditionality have greatly 
weakened the autonomy of recipient countries. The vast majority of poor countries in 
Africa, and many in Latin America and Asia, have been subject to a series of IMF and 
World Bank adjustment packages, especially over the last twenty years. These 
reforms cover all the major economic decisions – budgets, tax and expenditure 
policies, exchange rates, trade and tariff policies, price policies, privatisation, credit 
policies – such that countries subject to them have very little control over their 
economic policies. Moreover, sectoral adjustment policies additionally expand the 
scope of conditionalities  – including education and health policies for example.  The 
Comprehensive Development Strategy of the World Bank further extends the realm of 
potential conditionality into the law and matters of governance. Conditionality thus 
has been a major source of disempowerment whether or not the policy reforms are in 
the recipient countries longer-term interests.  
 
A lack of local enthusiasm for what appeared to be agency imposed-programmes was 
widely believed to be due to limited country ‘ownership’ of the programmes, leading 
to delays or failures in implementation. Consequently, the agencies began to argue the 
case for greater ownership.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are the 
most concrete and widespread manifestation of IMF/WB efforts to increase country 
ownership. The question we aim to address in this paper is whether and to what extent 
PRSPs have effectively empowered poor countries, or whether, as some have 
suggested
2 they are ‘window dressing’ which in reality empower neither poor 
countries nor poor people, but rather enforce the power of the international agencies 
by giving the appearance of ownership without the reality. 
 
 
PRSPs  explicitly incorporate participation into the IMF/WB lending framework for 
poor countries. They follow a long history of concern with participation in the 
development community, spanning nearly four decades.  Starting with a series of 
high-level declarations of support for ‘popular participation’ by international 
development organisations in the 1970s, to the re-orientation of bilateral aid projects 
towards ‘customer focus’ and ‘stakeholder participation’ in the 1990s, the concept of 
participation has increasingly been mainstreamed in donor-developing country policy 
dialogue.
3   
 
The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) claim that PRSPs are country driven 
and nationally owned: 
‘Country ownership is the guiding principle…the process and content [of PRSPs] 
must be designed nationally to suit local circumstances and capacities, and 
should be useful to the country, not only external donors’ (Klugman 2003, our 
italics) 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to very helpful comments from Jeni Klugman, and to those of the participants at the 
April conference. 
2 For example, 39 organizations and regional networks in 15 African countries agreed at a meeting in 
Kampala, May 2001, that PRSPs ‘were simply window dressing’. See Bretton Woods Project (2001). 
3 Cornwall (2000) provides a useful survey of the participatory trends in development policy since the 
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Moreover, ‘participation’ of civil society is regarded as essential to achieving the 
principle of national ownership:   
 
Poverty Reduction Strategies should be country-driven, promoting national 
ownership of strategies by involving broad-based participation by civil society 
(IMF 2002b, our italics) 
 
 
PRSPs were first introduced in 1999, and 30 had been produced  at the time of 
writing. Therefore we now have some evidence to permit us to make a preliminary 
assessment of them, although because of their short history it is only possible to 
analyse the process and content of the PRSPs, not their impact when implemented.  
Our concern here is the extent to which they have increased national ownership of 
programmes, and thereby have empowered the countries.  This is a difficult question 
to answer not least because ‘national ownership’ is not an unproblematic concept, nor 
is ‘empowerment’.   
 
The term ‘ownership’ is borrowed from the realm of private property over goods or 
land, where it generally has a well-defined legal meaning, but also involves a 
psychological aspect, a perception of possession. When transferred to policy 
programmes, the legal aspect, which underpins the concept in its normal use, 
disappears, and we are left with the psychological aspect. This psychological aspect 
could be just a matter of perceptions, without any change in underlying realities – i.e. 
that governments/local people are induced to believe they have ownership of what are 
essentially unchanged reality, by reformed processes, such as the PRSP might bring 
about. But a genuine change in the underlying reality is likely to be needed to bring 
about a lasting change in perceptions. This would require that the national 
contribution to the design of policy programmes substantially increases, even if it 
does not become exclusive.  
 
There is also a question of what national ownership implies: is it a matter of 
governments’ increased contributions to policy design and consequently changed 
perceptions, or that of civil society, or some combination? From the point of view of 
the democratic legitimacy of the process, any democratically elected government 
must be involved; in such cases, the role of civil society is more questionable – it 
certainly has an important role in helping form and check on government policy, but it 
does not necessarily have an independent right to determine policy;
4 where 
democracy is limited, or non-existent, however, there is a special need to involve civil 
society to ensure popular participation in the process. In general, in both democracies 
and non-democracies, including civil society in the process is likely to help to  
increase perceptions of national ownership, and improve implementation, since this, 
of course, involves both government and civil society. 
 
While national ownership can be increased just by changing perceptions, national 
empowerment cannot. National empowerment means that national actors (government 
and civil society) have a greater say in the design of policies. Hence we are concerned 
in this paper with whether PRSPs bring about a genuine and substantial change 
                                                 
4 See Whitehead (2002) for a subtle overview of the ways the complex relationships between 
‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’ have been viewed.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 4 
 
towards greater national contribution to the design of policy programmes.  We are not 
so much concerned here with whether PRSPs particularly empower the poor, which is 
also one of their objectives  – not because this is unimportant, but because it is not 
necessarily relevant to the general issue of national empowerment.  
 
While the PRSP process assumes that participation will increase national ownership, 
how far it does so must depend on who participates, whether participation actually 
affects the design of the programmes, or merely provides endorsement to externally 
designed programmes, as well as the scope and coverage of the PRSP process. It 
would be possible to have genuine and effective participation (i.e. participation which 
changes the nature of the programmes), yet to achieve little national empowerment 
because the arena over which the PRSP rules represents only a small part of the 
decision-making affected by outside agencies.  
 
Specifically, to shed light on these issues we aim to explore: 
•  who is involved in the PRSP process 
•  how far programmes change as a result 
•  what proportion of IFI-affected decision-making  is covered by the PRSPs.  
  
The remainder of the paper  investigates these questions adopting two perspectives – 
first, examining the process through which countries have developed PRSPs;  and 
second, examining the policies contained in the documents, aiming to assess whether 
the process has brought about a change in the content of policies and the coverage of 
the programmes.  The sources consulted consist of countries’ completed PRSP 
documents, as well as some primary and secondary contributions.  
 
The next section first provides a brief overview of PRSPs.  Sections III and IV present 
a general discussion of the meaning of participation and examine the available 
experience with drafting PRSPs, looking at who has been consulted and in what 
manner.  Section V then asks whether or not participation appears to have had an 
impact on the policy content of PRSP documents.  Section VI examines the 
importance of PRSPs in the wider realm of IFI decision making, while Section VII 
concludes.   
 
II.  Overview of PRSPs 
 
PRSPs now form the basis for all multilateral lending to the poorest developing 
countries.  They are policy documents produced by borrower countries outlining the 
economic, social and structural programmes to reduce poverty, to be implemented 
over a three-year period.  They were developed as the main vehicle to implement the 
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) – the World Bank’s new long-term, 
holistic approach to lending practices which claims to place poverty reduction at the 
fore and to allow recipient countries to own and direct their development agendas.    
 
Since 1999 recipients of debt relief under the enhanced ‘Heavily indebted poor 
countries’ initiative (HIPC), as well as of concessional IDA lending and the IMF’s 
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF), have been required to produce a PRSP.  
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Fund, part of which, in principle, is based upon an acceptable participatory process.
5  
Following one year’s implementation, countries which qualify for HIPC relief receive 
the full cancellation of their agreed-upon debt, the so-called ‘completion point’.  
Countries can access temporary (‘decision point’) debt relief before completing a full 
PRSP by producing an interim document (I-PRSP) outlining strategies to be 
employed in the final document.   
 
Nearly all low-income and highly in-debted countries have produced, or are in the 
process of producing, a PRSP.  As of January 2003, the number totalled 77, roughly a 
third of which (30) have submitted a full PRSP, with the remainder an I-PRSP (22), or 
in  process of producing an I-PRSP (25) (Table 1).  Of the 30 countries that have 
submitted a final PRSP, 23 have received approval from the Boards of the Bank and 
Fund, and eight have been implementing programmes for more than a year (Albania, 
Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Honduras, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, 
Uganda).  In terms of geographic distribution, the majority of countries involved are 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (39), with the remaining distributed fairly evenly across 
East Asia & Pacific (11), Europe & Central Asia (11); Latin America & Caribbean 
(9), and South Asia (7).  The PRSP process is furthest underway in the SSA and 
Europe & Central Asian regions, with most countries possessing either a completed 
PRSP or I-PRSP (with SSA leading the way in implementation of programmes), and 
have made least progress in the East Asian and South Asian regions, with the majority 
of countries still in the process of producing an I-PRSP. 
                                                 
5 The Bank has not specified what constitutes an acceptable participatory process, arguing that the great 
diversity of country contexts and capacities prevents the application of any one standard.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 6 
 
 
Table 1  Countries in the PRSP Process (early 2003) 
 
FULL  INTERIM  FORTHCOMING 
Albania  Armenia  Afghanistan 
Azerbaijan  Bosnia and Herzegovina  Angola 
Benin  Cape Verde  Bangladesh 
Bolivia  Central African Republic  Bhutan 
Burkina Faso  Chad  Burundi 
Cambodia  Cote d'Ivoire  Comoros 
Cameroon  D.R. Congo  Congo 
Ethiopia  Djibouti  Dominica 
Gambia  Georgia  East Timor 
Ghana  Guinea Bissau  Eritrea 
Guinea  Kenya  Grenada 
Guyana  Lao  Indonesia 
Honduras  Lesotho  Kiribati 
Kyrgzstan  Macedonia  Maldives 
Malawi  Madagascar  Nepal 
Mali  Moldova  Nigeria 
Mauritania  Pakistan  Samoa 
Mongolia  Sao Tome and Principe  Solomon Islands 
Mozambique  Sierra Leone  St Lucia 
Nicaragua  Togo  St Vincent 
Niger  Yugoslavia  Sudan 
Rwanda    Tonga 
Senegal    Uzbekistan 
Sri Lanka    Vanuatu 
Tajikstan    Zimbabwe 
Tanzania     
Uganda     
Vietnam     
Yemen     
Zambia     
Source: World Bank website. 
 
III.  The Meaning of Participation 
 
Participation has been used to mean different things in different contexts.  One 
important distinction is whether it is interpreted to involve  ‘empowerment’, implying 
significant control over decision-making, or whether it simply means rudimentary 
levels of consultation, where little delegation of decision-making powers occurs 
(Nelson and Wright 1995).  Another distinction is between whether it is viewed as a 
means or an end (Goulet 1989).  An instrumental approach views participation as a 
means to improving implementation, efficiency and equity, while an empowerment 
approach values the process of increasing participation as an important end in itself.   
 
At a minimum, participation clearly requires that individuals and groups are in some 
way involved in the decision making process.  This engagement can assume any of a 
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information-sharing (2) consultation (3) joint decision-making to (4) initiation and 
control by stakeholders . ( World Bank (1996); McGee 2000; Narayan et al 2000). At 
one end ‘information sharing’ involves very limited decision making powers but 
potentially important knowledge transfer.  At the other lies ‘initiation and control’, 
which implies a high degree of citizen control over decision-making.  In between, 
‘consultation’ exists when participants are able to express opinions but their 
perspectives are not necessarily incorporated into the final product;   ‘joint decision-
making’, on the other hand, gives participants the shared right to negotiate the content 
of strategy.  The boundaries of this classification are of course not clear-cut, and the 
type of participation involved varies with different stages of the policy-making 
process (e.g., early stages might involve more information-sharing, while later stages 
more consultation and joint-decision making). From the perspective of national 
empowerment, participation needs to be at the initiation and control end of the 
spectrum.  
 
There is also the question of who is empowered by the new process, which depends 
on who is consulted. Early exercises in participation were mainly concerned with 
development projects, and in this context participation was intended to cover those 
affected by the projects. Subsequently, Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) 
were introduced, intended to ascertain what the poor themselves believe about their 
condition,
6  in which case, it is poor people who should participate.  But the PRSPs  
differ from both these approaches, being centrally concerned with policy. The 
selection of groups, how representatives are chosen and how capable they are 
constitute important factors influencing the legitimacy as well as the effectiveness of 
the process.  The extent of national ownership and empowerment is greatly affected 
by such considerations.  While groups affected by the policies form one important 
constituency, a democratically elected government, in principle, is the legitimate 
representative of the people, more so than many Civil Society Organisations (CSOs),  
such as NGOs, which vary in how representative they are.  If  national empowerment 
is to be achieved through  PRSPs the government must be  the most important 
participant, with local CSOs a useful adjunct, where they genuinely represent local 
groups, especially the poor.    
 
Finally, an important consideration relevant to ownership and empowerment lies in 
the manner in which participants are involved.  Issues here are (1) whether the 
mechanisms for participation (e.g., conferences, voting procedures) are conducive to 
generating broad-based participation – for example, the timing and location of events 
can significantly impact the character of participants; (2) whether information is 
widely available; and (3) the policy-areas and stages of the decision making process 
in which participation occurs.  Equally important is the level at which participation 
takes place, whether it is confined to the national stage or involves regional and local 
levels as well. 
 
These considerations suggest that participatory processes can be judged on both the 
intensity of participants’ engagement (e.g., information-sharing, consultation or joint 
decision making) and the degree of inclusion or exclusion of various groups.  From 
the perspective of identifying whether PRSPs are genuinely nationally empowering, 
the participatory process must: 
                                                 
6 See Naryan et al. (2000). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 8 
 
•  be towards the initiation and control end of the spectrum; 
•  be an objective, not merely instrumental; 
•  give democratically elected governments
7 a central role; 
•  incorporate a wide range of non-governmental stakeholders,  each with 
capable and representative participation. 
•  give a much reduced role to external actors, official and NGO. 
 
The World Bank’s Definition of Participation 
 
In its Source Book for Poverty Reduction Strategies (2002), the World Bank defines 
participation as: 
 
‘the process by which stakeholders influence and share control over priority 
setting, policymaking, resource allocations, and/or program implementation’ 
(237). 
    
The Sourcebook expects the following groups to participate (Box 7.6, p. 250):    
(1) The general public, particularly the poor and vulnerable groups;  
(2) The government, including parliament, local government, line and central 
ministries;  
(3) Civil Society Organisations such as NGOs, community-based organisations; 
trade unions and guilds, academic institutions;  
(4) Private sector actors such as professional associations;  
(5) Donors, both bilateral and multilateral.   
 
From these statements, it would appear that the World Bank envisages participation in 
PRSPs to be towards the initiation and control end of the spectrum – participants 
should be able to ‘influence’ and ‘control’ policymaking and agenda-setting, as well 
as budgeting and implementation.  The World Bank’s vision of the participation also 
suggests an inclusive process, encompassing extremely broad sectors of domestic 
society and international stakeholders, not only marginalized individuals, but also 
relevant representative institutions and umbrella groups.  However, we should note 
that the involvement of donors (bilateral and multilateral) in the participatory process 
weakens the national ownership/empowerment consequences. In order for this 
involvement not to negate any national empowerment effects, it is important that they 
do not dominate the process, by setting the agenda, by their articulateness in 
discussions, and by their implicit financial clout. 
 
In the next two sections, we will examine whether the reality of the PRSP 
participatory process has lived up to the claims of generating national ownership.  In 
assessing participation in PRSPs, we limit ourselves to examining participation only 
in the policy making process, not in either budgeting or implementation.  We will 
assess participation along two lines:  first in terms of the ‘process’ of policy 
formation, assessing the degree of inclusion, asking  who has participated, in what 
manner they have participated, and the issues in which they have participated; and 
secondly in terms of the content of PRSPs,  asking whether the PRSP process has 
affected the policy content of the final documents. 
                                                 
7 This is an easy condition to state, but ‘democracy’ is not at all straightforward to define (see 
Whitehead, 2002), and, almost however defined, in relatively newly established ‘democracies’ full 
democratisation is unlikely. This itself is a reason to give a large role to civil society.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 9 
 
 
IV.  The Process of Formulating PRSPs 
 
(a) Who Participates? 
 
It is difficult to generalise about the range of actors consulted in PRSPs given the 
diversity of country experiences.  In some cases, there has been broad involvement 
across all the categories outlined in the World Bank’s Sourcebook.  Uganda, Rwanda 
and Vietnam have been acknowledged both by civil society and donors alike as 
having fostered such comprehensive participation.
8  In Uganda, broad-based 
participation was achieved first through Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs), 
which paved the way for constructive consultations between Government and civil 
society for the PRSP.  Participation in the final document was widespread with the 
Government ensuring heavy public and NGO input through a large scale and high 
profile media campaign and regional consultation workshops that made concerted 
efforts to include stakeholders beyond the capital (McGee 2002, p.70).  The creation 
of an umbrella organisation to channel civil society efforts ensured wide civil society 
participation in the debate over the final document.  
 
In Rwanda, broad participation was achieved by incorporating existing indigenous 
participatory practices known as Ubedehe into the PRSP process.  This involved a 
bottom-up approach to participatory design, the government targeting 9,000 cellules 
to produce public action priority rankings and community development plans, as well 
as a PPA and Policy Relevance Test to collect poor peoples’ opinions on the 
relevance of sectoral policies (Bugingo 2002).  Participation appears to have been 
largely home-grown as a result, with broad consensus that there was grassroots 
participation at most stages which has helped in the post-conflict reconciliation and 
peace-building process. 
 
Vietnam is another case of extensive participation. Both donors and civil society 
observers agree that Vietnam’s participatory process involved a broad range of actors, 
largely the result of good pre-existing relations between government structures and 
Vietnamese NGOs, particularly at the local level (SGTS et al 2000, p. 23).  The 
government has involved local NGOs directly in its formal discussions with 
international donors.  In other cases, local NGOs were able to express their 
perspectives in national policy dialogues through partnerships with international 
NGOs and donors.   
 
In other countries, some categories of participants were more engaged than others, 
while some were left out.  For example, the private sector was particularly active in 
Mozambique (McGee and Taimo 2001), while it was notably absent in Rwanda 
(Mutebi et al 2003, p. 260).  Religious organisations were quite important in Bolivia 
and Nicaragua but were missing in other countries. 
 
There has been substantial government involvement in almost all countries, with high-
level political authority guiding and managing the process of participation, though the 
breadth of involvement has been variable, with some (e.g., Kenya) exhibiting 
                                                 
8 For Uganda see Gariyo (2001); Robb and Scott (2001); and Worodofa (2002). For Vietnam see STGS 
et al (2000).  For Rwanda, see references in McGee (2002); Bugingo (2002); Mutebi (2003). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 10 
 
participation across different levels of government as well as different Ministries, 
while in others the process was led principally by the finance or planning ministry and 
concentrated at the national level (e.g., Mali and Malawi).
9   
 
Donors, including IFI representatives, have also displayed differing levels of 
engagement.  In terms of designing the participatory process, it is reported that most 
have taken a relatively ‘hands-off’ approach, allowing national government greater 
room than before in conducting national and regional consultations (e.g., see Booth 
2001, p. 27).  Donor involvement has ranged from assuming an observer’s role to 
organising and financing consultations directly.  However, when it comes to more 
substantive issues surrounding policy design, the record is less clear at to whether 
significant changes have occurred.  In some countries such as Ghana, Killick and 
Abugre (2001) report that IFI representatives specifically avoided excessive 
involvement in drafting the PRSP (p. 13).  But there are reports of heavy IFI 
involvement in the drafting of Tanzania’s IPRSP (Evans 2003), and little 
improvement in the transparency of negotiations with IFI officials in Malawi’s PRSP 
(Jenkins and Tsoka 2003).  The role of external actors appears even less changed with 
regard to lending facilities outside the PRSP process, as we will discuss further below.  
These issues have critical bearing for national ownership and empowerment and will 
be discussed further in Sections V and VI.   
 
Despite the variety of experiences several key categories of participants have been 
excluded from the participatory process consistently across a number of countries.  
We summarize them briefly: 
 
Groups Missing from Consultations    
 
•  Parliamentarians: In a number of countries, the role of national Parliaments in 
formulating PRSPs has been minimal, particularly in Africa (Booth 2001), 
although this has also been a problem in Latin America (see Troacaire 2002).  
In some cases this has resulted from a lack of capacity to become actively 
involved, in others, because they have been left out of the process.  In Malawi, 
for example, ‘only 5 MPS were involved in the process’ (cited in Eurodad 
2001, p.9).  In Kenya, less than 10 percent of MPs attended consultations 
(Panos Institute 2002, p. 25).  In Senegal and Mali parliamentarians were only 
officially included in the final ratification of the PRSP (Phillips 2002; Dante et 
al 2003). Only six of the 83 MPs in Benin participated in meetings  (Biershenk 
et al 2003). In general, it appears that in most African countries there is a 
tendency for PRSPs to be seen as ‘technical planning processes that are 
properly the affair of the government, and not a subject for party-political 
debate’ (Booth 2001, p 41).’
10   
                                                 
9 For Kenya see Hanmer et al (2003); Mali see Dante et al (2003); Malawi see Jenkings and Tsoka 
(2003). 
10It must be acknowledged however that effectiveness of parliamentarians in articulating local 
priorities depends on the quality and general importance of parliamentary institutions in countries.  In 
some, they do not exist (e.g., Rwanda and Uganda), while in others they are sub-ordinate to the 
executive or to existing patronage systems (e.g., Ghana and Kenya).  As such the lack of parliamentary 
involvement in some countries may not have made much difference.  
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•  Trade Unions: The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(IFCTU) reports that trade unions were not systematically consulted in many 
early PRSP processes.  Although in some cases  trade unions  represent narrow 
sectional interests, from a participatory perspective their exclusion in many 
countries is problematic since they generally represent an important group.  In 
Tanzania and Uganda national trade unions were told they could participate in 
the PRSP process only after the PRSP had already been completed and 
endorsed by the IFIs (ICFTU 2002).  In Mali, neither trade unions and nor the 
important Cotton Producers’ Association participated at all (Dante et al 2003).  
There has been some evidence however of trade unions enjoying substantive 
participation in transition countries where as a result of the Soviet legacy there 
have been traditionally close relations between governments and trade unions 
(ODI 2003b).  
 
•  Women: In a number of countries, participation of women’s groups appear to 
be weak (World Bank 2001).  In Senegal, the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (2001) found ‘Civil Society organisations were 
ignored, especially women’.  Zuckerman (2001) reports that in both Tanzania 
and Bolivia, consultations with women’s groups were very limited (p.10).  
McGee (2002) reports that very few women’s groups were made aware of 
consultations in Malawi.  But there are reports that some countries made 
special efforts to include women.  In Kenya, the Centre for Gender and 
Development was instrumental in lobbying for a gender-aware process (ODI 
2002, 4), while in Lesotho, a survey found that a majority of communities felt 
that efforts had been made in the PRSP process to encourage women’s 
participation (Panos Institute 2002, p. 43).   
 
•  Marginalised Groups:  Many CSOs have been critical of national processes 
for leaving out the poor in consultations.  Action Aid (2002) reports that at 
least five of its country programmes have complained that there has been little 
direct involvement of associations of the poor in PRSP deliberations.  Critics 
of the process in Bolivia also report that organisations representing certain 
groups – such as homesteaders, peasants, and indigenous peoples – did not 
themselves attend and were represented by local authorities who were only 
weakly connected to the poor, particularly indigenous groups (Uriona et al 
2002). 
 
In many cases, participation has been excessively selective. Groups out of favour with 
the government have often not been invited.  In Ghana, for example, trade union 
members reported that ‘the Government preferred to consult with more sympathetic 
institutions, like the Civil Servants Union (which was not a member of the TUC), than 
with bodies which carry real weight within civil society’ (Quoted in SGTS et al 2000, 
p.19).  Christian Aid (2001) reports that in Bolivia, civil society participants felt that 
the government’s selection of participants for the ‘National Dialogue’ was not 
impartial or representative of society (p.14).  In Cameroon, the Catholic Relief 
Services (2001) reports that the government handpicked participants in civil society 
consultations, bypassing important civil society institutions such as the Catholic 
Church which were key campaigners for debt relief (p. 10).  In Tanzania, the process QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 12 
 
for selecting civil society representatives was never made public or transparent 
(McGee 2002, p. 66). 
 
In other cases, NGO participation was limited to international NGOs, or NGOs in the 
capital area.  In some cases, smaller and rural NGOs, generally those with the most 
contact with the poor, were excluded from the process.  In Bolivia, for example, only 
one NGO outside La Paz was invited to initial consultations, while one of the most 
prominent local NGOs in La Paz was not invited (World Development Movement 
2001).  In Senegal, smaller CSOs, expressed the view that the PRSP process seemed 
more geared toward large NGOs (Phillips 2002, p. 56).   
 
Even where a broad range of NGOs have participated, it is not always clear they were 
necessarily representative of broader societal concerns, while foreign NGOs 
frequently played an important role.  This is particularly a concern in fractionalised 
communities, where local élite interests may dominate (Hoddinott 2002).  Even in 
fairly homogeneous and united communities, the ability of Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) to be fully representative of the constituencies they claim to 
represent is often limited by constraints on their outreach capacity; or because they 
are dominated by urban professionals with little ‘natural’ constituency among poor 
communities; or by interest groups more interested in pressing their own case.  For 
example, Killick and Abugre report that the non-state actors involved in drafting 
Ghana’s PRSP were donor-driven and not representative of pro-poor constituencies.
11 
 
(b) In What manner? 
 
Countries have employed a variety of strategies for consultation and information 
dissemination, both formal and informal.  These have included national and regional 
conferences to discuss PRSP drafts and proposals, where representative groups from 
civil society, sometimes identified by the government or CSOs at the government’s 
behest, were invited to contribute inputs for the analysis of poverty and prioritising 
public actions.  In some cases national consultations have been general in scope, and 
in others organised along thematic or sectoral lines.  In several countries (e.g., 
Nicaragua and Bolivia) they built upon participatory mechanisms that had already 
been enshrined in national legislation (ODI 2003a). Other methods have included 
local surveys asking villagers for inputs into prioritising public action and resource 
allocation, as well as media campaigns ranging from TV, radio and newspaper 
announcements (e.g., Malawi, Tanzania, Rwanda and Kenya).  PPAs have taken place 
in some countries (e.g., Uganda, Vietnam and Rwanda) to inform the poverty analysis 
that underpins the PRSP, and have included problem or solution ranking designed to 
inform policy prioritisation and budget allocations.  However, there have been 
problems with the design and implementation of participatory processes, including the 




Because debt relief is conditional on producing PRSPs, there is a strong incentive for 
countries HIPC-eligible countries (accounting for more than half the countries 
                                                 
11 Killick and Abugre (2001) p. 32. Nonetheless, there are examples of attempts to ensure that the 
CSOs are representative  In Uganda, for example, the composition of the task force charged with 
representing CSOs was determined through an election involving 45 NGOs (Gariyo 2001). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 13 
 
producing PRSPs) to complete as soon as possible in order to lock-in debt relief 
(Adam and Bevan 2001).  Considerable evidence suggests this link has compromised 
the quality of participation.  The Mozambique Debt group (2001) reports that ‘the 
consultation process was driven inordinately by a deadline for the completion of the 
PRSP, which even with good faith on the part of the government, provided inadequate 
time to carry out a comprehensive consultation process’ (quoted in Christian Aid 
2001, p.33).  In Ethiopia, the government attempted consultations in over 100 districts 
in just three days (Muwonge et al 2002). In many cases, CSOs were not given 
sufficient time to prepare for consultation.  From a review of its country programmes 
in six countries in Africa and Latin America, Action Aid (2002) reports that there was  
a lack of adequate prior notice regarding meetings and consultations.  Many were 
informed only 2 or 3 days in advance, and in the case of Nepal, 24-hour prior 
notice was given on one occasion…nearly all country programs felt such last 
minute notification prevented them from preparing adequately for PRS 
consultations; lengthy reports and documents could not be commented upon and 
the views of community partners could not be sought (p. 7).   
 
In Bolivia, Honduras, and Cameroon, the Catholic Relief Service also complained of 
being given only a day’s notice before consultations, with insufficient preparatory 
information or material
12 .  The frequency of participation also appears to have been 
negatively affected by the PRSP’s time frame. In many cases, there have been reports 
of local consultation workshops taking place only once over the course of a day 
without any further possibilities for participation at the local level (e.g., Honduras and 
Cameroon) (Save the Children 2001).  This was particularly the case in Tanzania, 
which had one of the most compressed PRSP timeframes (six months from initiation 
to cabinet approval) and where the only local consultations took place over the course 
of a single day (Evans 2003).  
 
Information Availability  
 
In general, the consensus has been that access to drafts and final versions of PRSPs 
and I-PRSPs has been relatively good in most countries.  However, there have been a 
number of cases where the availability of information has been hampered by: 
 
•  Access:  Many CSOs have complained about a lack of access to core World 
Bank and IMF documents.  In Nicaragua, the draft interim PRSP was available 
in English in Washington before it was available in Managua (ODI 2003a).  In 
a survey of eight PRSP countries McGee (2002) found that the  
sharing of information with CSOs who take an active part in PRSP 
processes has been patchy.  Governments have often appeared 
reluctant to share early drafts of PRSPs or budgetary information, 
which would be pertinent in consultative prioritisation exercises…In 
general, information seems not to have reached rural populations in 
time to encourage broad and well-informed participation in 
consultations; civil society has sometimes taken over the task of 
information dissemination when they consider governments’ efforts or 
plans inadequate (Mozambique) (p. 9).   
 
It has been reported that in Haiti, civil society groups have had trouble in 
obtaining even basic information such as which government ministry is 
                                                 
12 Ctaholic Relief Service (2001), p 22.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 14 
 
leading the process and the timeline for its formulation (Christian Aid 2001, 
14).  In Senegal, civil society groups were expected to comment on initial 
drafts without having received it beforehand, although this appears to have 
been rectified at later stages of the process (Phillips 2002, p. 56).  In Bolivia, 
although civil society participants had been promised the opportunity to view 
and approve the final PRSP at the end of the ‘National Dialogue’, this 
opportunity never materialised (Christian Aid, 2001, 33).  Zambian NGOs also 
expressed concern that they did not receive all key documents and information 
necessary for effective participation in PRSP formulation, even basic 
information such as the amount of interim debt reduction (CRS 2001, 21). 
 
More generally, although many have heard about them, knowledge of exactly 
what PRSPs involve appears to have been scarce amongst the populace in 
many of the first PRSP countries.  In a survey of Africa’s experience with 
developing PRSPs, Booth (2001) finds:   
 
there is a tendency for the facts of the PRSP initiative to be fully grasped 
only by a small core of government personnel who have been directly 
responsible for carrying it forward.  In some cases, a similar level of 
understanding is shared by a small number of academics or civil-society 
representatives…the availability of even quite elementary information on the 
subject declines quite steeply as one moves away from these central points. 
(p. 20) 
 
Language: The choice of language in several cases has limited civil society 
participation. For example, Cambodia’s PRSP was only made available in Khmer in 
the final version and not in earlier drafts (NGO Forum on Cambodia 2001).  In 
Bolivia some PRSP documents were initially only produced in English (Christian Aid 
2001, p.13).  A Spanish version followed but documents were never translated into 
local languages such as Aymara, Quechwa or Guarani (ibid.). 
 
Level of Consultations   
 
In some countries, consultations were held mainly in urban areas which limited the 
participation of rural actors.  The IFCTU (2001) reports that consultation has been 
particularly deficient in rural areas in Africa, despite poverty being most acute there.  
In Mozambique rural communities and northern districts were far less involved in the 
consultation process than Maputo-based organisations (Christian Aid 2001, 33).  The 
limited scope of consultations manifested itself in low awareness of the PRSP among 
civil society outside Maputo (Falck et al 2003).   In other countries, consultations 
were limited to the national level, with few attempts to involve participants at the 
local level.  Tanzanian officials and the PRSP itself state that the poor at the village 
level were not adequately consulted at the formulation station (McGee 2002, p.6).  It 
is precisely the lack of local level consultation that has prompted a number of CSOs 
to undertake their own grassroots consultations through parallel, civil-society run 
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(c) About What? 
 
Exclusion from the PRSP drafting process 
 
A recurrent complaint in almost all countries has been that governments have come to 
discussions with pre-prepared drafts frameworks for PRSPs; CSOs have rarely been 
able to engage in the design of frameworks.  CRS (2001) claims this has been the case 
in Zambia, Honduras and Bolivia:  
 
In Bolivia, citizen participation in the PRSP drafting process was severely limited.  
Instead, a small circle of government economists undertook drafting to the PRSP 
plan for more than four months without including or even informing civil society 
organizations that had participated in the National Dialogue.  Bolivian 
organizations tried repeatedly to pressure the government to be more inclusive, 
even appealing to international donors and the World Bank and IMF, but to no 
avail.’ (p.10).   
 
That the PRSP in Bolivia was drafted in a non-transparent manner is indicated by the 
fact that the final PRSP was received by CSOs through the German Ministry of 
International Development (IBIS 2001, 124).  In Senegal, a main concern of civil 
society groups has been that when the PRSP process was launched in June 2001, the 
government appeared with its analysis already prepared (Phillips 2003, p.56).   In 
Zambia, CSOs have been denied representation on the Technical Committee for 
drafting the PRSP, despite a large and active coalition of groups organised to co-
ordinate input into the PRSP (CRS 2001, p.11).   A UNDP assessment of Lesotho’s 
PRSP found that the procedures were designed to conduct the participatory process 
after the PRSP draft was already prepared instead of before (cited in McGee 2002, p. 




Countries implementing PRSPs start from very different positions  and, to some 
extent,  processes should be judged relative to starting conditions.   National or civil 
society ownership is unlikely to be as high in countries with unstable or factionalised 
polities as it would be in more stable and unified societies.  Yet, even taking different 
country conditions into consideration, the fact remains that in many countries key 
elements of participation have been seriously flawed.  Key sections of civil society 
(e.g., women, religious organisations, workers’ movements, rural groups) and 
government (e.g., line ministries and parliament) have been missing from the process 
or insufficiently represented.  In some cases, this has been because the design of 
participation has specifically excluded or neglected particular groups.  In other cases, 
participation has been narrowed by rushed timeframes, a lack of information, poor 
dissemination in appropriate languages, and consultation processes which failed to 
reach local and rural communities.  In almost no cases did civil society participate in 
the drafting the framework for initial PRSPs.  Most were presented with drafts 
formulated by small teams of external consultants or central ministry staff.  From the 
perspective of ownership, these limitations to the participatory process have 
constrained the perception that programmes were popularly owned.   
 
We should note that in all these cases, the complaint is that civil society was not fully 
involved in the process, which was initiated by governments. However, from our QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 16 
 
perspective a strong involvement of governments could lead to national 
empowerment, even if not the empowerment of civil society or the poor. A 
fundamental issue then is how far the national governments were independent of the 
IFIs and able to part from the IFI script. This is difficult to ascertain from a process 
perspective without detailed anthropological enquiry, but we can come to tentative 
conclusions on the basis of the contents of the programmes – which we turn to next.   
 
V.  The Content of PRSPs 
 
This section examines whether countries appear to be empowered from the 
perspective of policy-making.  Earlier adjustment programmes were criticised for 
their ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to policy design, and the resulting uniformity of 
reform packages across different countries.  If PRSPs are genuinely country owned 
we would expect to see considerable variation across country programmes reflecting 
different national priorities and inputs from participation, and for policies to diverge 
from standard orthodox packages.   
 
Has participation by civil society affected the design of programmes? 
 
Participation has had its greatest impact in improving the quality and broadening the 
scope of poverty diagnostics.  In many countries, the official definition of poverty has 
become much more multi-dimensional in character in the PPA work around the 
PRSP.
13  ActionAid Vietnam reports that ‘PPAs and other consultative 
exercises…have created a lot of opportunities for government participants to learn 
more about the causes of poverty.  This has led to national plans becoming more 
‘people-centred and pro-poor’’(quoted in Zaman, 2002, p.7).  The majority of 
countries have also broadened their definition and analysis of poverty to include such 
dimensions as security, vulnerability and powerlessness. However, we should note 
that a move towards a multidimensional approach to poverty has formed an important 
element in the recent international poverty agenda – for example in the World Bank’s 
World Development Report on Poverty (2000/1) and in the Bank-initiated Voices of 
the Poor.  On the World Bank webpage the introduction to poverty states: 
 
                    What is poverty? 
 
            Poverty is hunger. Poverty is lack of shelter. Poverty is being sick and not 
being able to see a doctor. Poverty is not being able to go to school and not  knowing 
how to read. Poverty is not having a job, is fear for the future, living one day at a 
time. Poverty is losing a child to illness brought about by unclean water. Poverty is 
powerlessness, lack of representation and freedom. 
 
The three major elements of poverty identified in the WDR 200/1 -- opportunity, 
empowerment, security --  are similar to those emerging from PRSPs - so the broader 
identification of poverty in the PRSPs can be interpreted as part of a process of 
advancing the international poverty agenda, rather than as a sign of national 
ownership of the PRSPs. 
                                                 
13 There have been, however, critiques of the poverty analysis in PRSPs, notably regarding the lack of 
clarity concerning the characteristics of poverty and its causes, as well as a lack of disaggregation of 
categories of the poor and failure to include  those vulnerable to poverty. See Thin et al (2001) and 
Marcus and Wilkinson (2002). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 17 
 
 
Better poverty diagnostics, in turn, has led to a stronger focus on sectoral policies in 
most countries.  All PRSPs emphasise the importance of increasing spending on basic 
services for the poor.  All strategies  aim to increase the access of the poor to 
education, health and clean water, in terms of both coverage and quality.  Vietnam’s 
PRSP, for example, commits itself to ensuring the 20/20 initiative is implemented – 
20 percent of aid and 20 percent of government expenditure is to be spent on basic 
social services (Vietnam 2002).  Similarly, Nicaragua’s PRSP aims to make 
additional investment in water and sanitation (Nicaragua 2001), while Bolivia’s PRSP 
has allocated social spending according to positive discrimination criteria for the first 
time, favouring the poorest municipalities (Bolivia 2001). Moreover, PRSPs have 
emphasised the importance of agricultural sector policies, such as developing food 
security policies, environmental protection, and increasing agricultural productivity, 
as well as promoting gender equality and protection of ethnic minorities and the 
vulnerable (children and the disabled). All these change, however,  are very much in 
line with the international poverty agenda. 
 
A more significant indication of some genuine contribution made by PRSPs is 
evidence that specific elements of civil society have been effective in lobbying 
national government to incorporate affirmative action policies.  In Kenya, ODI (2002) 
reports that Pastoralist Groups successfully lobbied to have their concerns over access 
to productive assets, natural resource management and extension services for 
livestock to be included in the final PRSP document.  They also managed to secure 
higher-than-average funding for education bursaries in pastoralist areas (McGee 2002 
p.42).  Women’s groups have also been successful in bringing gender concerns into 
Kenya’s final PRSP and influencing budget allocations (McGee 2002, p. 43). Action 
Aid country offices similarly report that HIV/AIDS groups in Malawi and rural 
peasant producers in Rwanda and Vietnam have been influential in shaping sectoral 
polices (Zaman 2002). There have also been cases in several countries where CSOs 
have successfully lobbied to have user fees abolished (Klugman, personal 
communication). 
 
By and large, however, it appears that participation has had limited impact on the 
wider content of PSRPs.  The perception among many civil society participants and 
third party observers has been that the recommendations made during consultations 
have largely not been incorporated in final documents.
 14   In Bolivia, civil society 
participants felt the initial draft bore little relation to the recommendations resulting 
from the ‘National Dialogue’  (Christian Aid 2002).  Only after mass demonstrations 
did the policy content shift, but still remained largely void of civil society 
recommendations for a wider approach to address poverty beyond social expenditure, 
such as land reform and political issues (Bendana 2001).  Leading NGO groups were 
so frustrated with the lack of impact that they lobbied Washington for Bolivia’s final 
document not to be approved (ODI 2003a).  The recommendations from parallel 
PRSP processes initiated and conducted by civil society in Honduras and Nicaragua 
were also effectively ignored in the final PRSP (IBIS 2001).  With respect to Ghana, 
Killick and Abugre (2001) report that ‘it appears that the results of the community 
consultations did not feed into the analyses and recommendations of the Teams [i.e., 
                                                 
14 It must be acknowledged, though, that in some cases this resulted because the recommendations from 
civil society were vague and un-implementable QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 18 
 
core teams for drafting PRSP chapters]’ (p.31).  In a survey of civil society 
recommendations in seven countries, Zaman (2002) found that, while in some 
countries the adoption of inputs appeared to be good (Rwanda, Vietnam), in the 
majority, civil society proposals were mostly not incorporated, particularly in areas of 
tax reform, budget-making, and civil service reforms (p. 8).  The general lack of 
tangible impact on policies would appear to corroborate the complaint from many 
civil society participants that their involvement was limited to information-
dissemination and consultation exercises at initial stages of policy design, and that 
they were excluded from decision making at the latter stages.  Indeed very few 
countries had any civil society representation on teams preparing the drafts following 
consultations, an exception being Malawi where strong civil society complaint led to 
their inclusion.   
 
The inability of civil society participation to affect policy is even more evident when 
it comes to structural reform issues (also see the next section).  Most CSOs report that 
they were barred from participating in macro-economic and structural policy 
discussions.
15  In a survey of eight countries, McGee (2002) reports that 
 
There is broad consensus among our civil society sources in Ghana, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Bolivia that NGOs and their coalitions have been 
totally unable to influence macro-economic policy or even engage governments in 
dialogue about it. (p. 13) 
 
In Bolivia, the umbrella NGO organisation, CEDLA, complained that the economic 
model was ‘a given’ and they were only permitted to tinker around the edges 
(Christian Aid 2001, 11).  Honduran NGOs also complain of being excluded from 
workshops on the macroeconomic chapter of the PRSP, which was included in the 
final document without ever having been circulated to CSOs or parliamentarians for 
discussion and input (ODI 2003a, p12).  Robb and Scott (2002) report that in six 
African PRSP and I-PRSPs policy discussions and workshops rarely discussed 
sequencing or alternative policies and trade-offs, and only in only one (Uganda) was 
there discussion on the impact of structural adjustment (p. 30).   
  
While national governments have been the agents of this exclusion, it appears they 
were also constrained in influencing the macro-economic framework.  The Honduran 
NGO network, Interforos, was told by government officials that ‘the Fund’s position 
with regard to macro-economic policies were not negotiable’ (Knoke and Morazan 
2002, p.16, fn.2).  In Kenya, the Finance Minister was reportedly sacked after a series 
of public statements that alleged the IMF and the World Bank were forcing the 
Government to undertake unwanted changes in its PRSP (Zaman 2002, 12).  In some 
countries, there has been the perception among government officials that altering the 
macro-economic framework would prevent endorsement from the Boards of the IFIs, 
leading to ‘self-censorship’.   A Finance Minister in a country developing a PRSP is 
quoted as saying: ‘We do not want to second guess the Fund.  We prefer to pre-empt 
them by giving them what they want before they start lecturing us about this and that.  
By doing so, we send a clear message that we know what we are doing – i.e., we 
                                                 
15 We should note that this does not apply to the private sector which appears to have influenced 
macroeconomic and investment policy in some cases where NGOs have been unable. See McGee and 
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believe in structural adjustment.’ (Quoted in Cheru 2001).  In their study of Ghana’s 
PRSP process, Killick and Abugre (2001) similarly describe  
 
a strong reported tendency towards self-censorship on the part of the Ghanaian 
authorities, writing into the GPRS drafts wording designed to meet the anticipated 
demands of the IFIs…such second-guessing…does qualify the claim of Ghanaian 
ownership, which implies the GoG [Government of Ghana] was free to write what it 
wanted. (p. 14) 
 
How far have programmes changed? 
 
Probably, the most effective way to assess whether the PRSPs have empowered 
countries in decisions about policy-making is to explore how far they have altered the 
basic thrust of reform programmes.   
 
If programmes were truly nationally controlled, we would expect at least some PRSPs 
to exhibit strategies that differ from the standard policy prescriptions in the past. 
However, a striking feature of nearly all PRSPs is the consistency among them of 
their approaches to poverty reduction.  All country programmes are based on the 
premise that private-sector led growth is the most effective way to reduce poverty.  
Although this growth is described variously as ‘pro-poor’ (e.g., Cambodia), ‘equity-
based’ (Burkina Faso) or ‘broad-based’ (Nicaragua), a general feature of all 
programmes is that they do not consider alternative approaches to poverty reduction, 
particularly those with an element of resource redistribution or that are rights-based.  
Indeed, there is a general disregard for distributional issues; projections of the 
beneficial impact of growth in country papers tend to assume a scenario where growth 
is accompanied by neutral distribution (e.g., see Tanzania’s PRSP). Even in PRSPs 
that more explicitly recognise the necessity for redistribution to ensure the poor 
benefit from growth, policies are either vague about how this should be done in 
practice (e.g. Azerbaijan, Ethiopia and Sri Lanka) or take redistribution simply to 
mean increasing the share of social spending devoted to the poor (e.g., Albania, 
Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Tajikstan). Where land reforms are mentioned, they usually 
refer to consolidating property rights and establishing legal titles for the development 
of property markets rather than re-allocating resources to the landless (e.g,. Albania, 
Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Niger, Rwanda, Tajikstan, Tanzania).  In only  a few 
countries, e.g., Mozambique and Uganda, are land reforms specifically targeted at 
improving the access of marginalized groups. 
 
Familiar Reforms 
A closer examination of the macro-economic and structural reform policy contents of 
the 30 completed PRSPs (see Table 2) reveals that there is no fundamental departure 
from the kind of policy advice provided under earlier structural adjustment 
programmes.  Current  policies contain all the elements of the first generation of 
policy reforms designed to promote the role of the market and ‘get the prices right’, 
and share a similar format and content involving all of the following: reforms: 
financial and trade liberalisation; privatisation; public sector reform; sectoral policies 
(e.g., infrastructure, energy and manufacturing); and social sector reform. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 20 
 
 


























































Reliance on macroeconomic stability for poverty 
reduction 
x   x  x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Trade Policy (tariff reduction/export promotion)  x   x  x  x  x     x  x   x  x 
Monetary Restraint  x  x  x  x   x   x  x  x  x  x  x 
Exchange Rate Policy  x  x  x  x     x  x  x  x   x  x 
Fiscal Restraint  x  x  x  x  x    x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Tax & Customs Reforms  x  x   x  x  x  x   x  x   x  x 
Price Control/Wage Policies  x  x                  x 
User Fees   x        x        x   x  x 
Sectoral Policies  x  x  x   x  x  x  x  x       x 
Public Sector Governance and Management 
Budget Management  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x 
MTEF  x  x  x  x   x  x   x  x     
Decentralization  x   x  x  x  x   x  x  x  x  x  x 
Public Administration Reform  x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Anti-curroption  x   x  x    x  x  x  x     x  x  x 
Financial Sector Reform 
Financial Institutions  x  x  x     x  x  x  x  x   x  x 
Financial Intermediation Policies  x  x         x  x  x  x   x  x 
Private Sector Development 
Privatization  x  x  x   x  x  x   x  x   x  x 
Price Liberalisation  x  x         x           
Legal and Judicial Reform  x   x  x   x  x  x  x  x   x  x  x 
Land Tenure Laws  x     x  x    x   x  x  x  x  x 
Social Sector Reforms 
Education   x  x  x     x  x  x  x   x  x 
Health   x  x  x   x  x  x  x  x   x  x 
Social Protection/Employment Promotion  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x     x  x  x 
Rural Livelihoods  x                      
Food security     x  x  x  x   x  x     x  x 
Environmental Protection  x   x  x   x  x  x     x  x  x 
Ethnic Minority Protection       x   x         x  x 
Gender Equity   x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x   x  x 
Children/Disabled   x  x  x      x     x   x  x 
Vulnerable Groups                   x   x    x 
Macro and Poverty sections separate?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Ex ante assessment of impact?  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
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reduction 
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Trade Policy (tariff reduction/export promotion)   x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x     x  x 
Monetary Restraint  x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Exchange Rate Policy     x  x         x  x  x  x  x  x 
Fiscal Restraint  x  x   x  x  x  x   x  x  x  x  x  x 
Tax & Customs Reforms  x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x  x   x  x  x 
Price Control/Wage Policies       x                 x 
User Fees     x     x     x  x     x 
Sectoral Policies  x  x  x  x   x  x  x  x     x  x  x 
Public Sector Governance and Management 
Budget Management  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
MTEF  x  x   x   x  x   x  x  x  x   
Decentralization  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Public Administration Reform  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Anti-corruption  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Financial Sector Reform 
Financial Institutions   x  x     x  x  x  x  x   x  x 
Financial Intermediation Policies   x  x  x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Private Sector Development                           
Privatization   x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x 
Price Liberalisation   x               x       x 
Legal and Judicial Reform  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Land Tenure Laws  x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x   x 
Social Sector Reforms 
Education  x  x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Health  x  x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Social Protection/Employment Promotion  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Rural Livelihoods   x     x  x  x       x   x 
Food security  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x   x 
Environmental Protection  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Ethnic Minority Protection         x          x         
Gender Equity  x  x   x  x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x  x 
Children/Disabled  x  x  x  x  x     x  x  x  x  x   
Vulnerable Groups  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x   
Macro and Poverty sections separate?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Ex ante assessment of impact?  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
Source: Own Analysis 
 
With regards to fiscal and monetary matters, the emphasis is still on maintaining 
‘current-account and fiscal balances consistent with low and declining debt levels; 
inflation in the low single digits; and rising per capita GDP’ (Ames et al, 2001, box 
2).  Tight monetary and fiscal policies to control inflation and budget deficits are 
proposed, along with tax and custom reforms to increase revenues, and a flexible 
exchange rate or movement towards one (unless part of a monetary union). 
 
The consistency with which countries have espoused policies of monetary and fiscal 
restraint, including in countries where hyper-inflation is not prevalent, weakens the 
claim of country ownership.  For example, among the 28 countries in SSA with 
PRSPs or I-PRSPs, only four (Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia) had a two-QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 22 
 
digit level of inflation in 2000, averaging slightly above 20 percent per annum 
(UNCTAD 2002).  The average for the other countries was around 3.5 percent, and 
the price level actually fell in five (Burkina Faso, Cape Vede, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali and 
Sierra Leone) (UNCTAD 2000).  Moreover, based on the Participatory Poverty 
Assessments conducted in many countries (e.g., Ethiopia and Nigeria), the rural poor 
stress that contactionary macroeonomic policies resulting in lower employment and 
declining wage bills in the public sector are more of a concern than inflation (Narayan 
et al, 2000, pp. 21 and 150).  Nor does it appear that HIPC Ministers themselves 
endorse the stance taken with respect to inflation and growth.  At the declaration of 
the 6
th HIPC Ministerial meeting, they urged the IFIs to: 
 
…think more closely about ways to increase growth and employment rather 
than further reducing inflation, about the supply-side (as well as demand-
side) causes of inflation and about defining sustainability of the budget 
deficit as including grants and debt relief (quoted in UNCTAD, 2002, p.25). 
 
Nevertheless, disinflation continues to be emphasized in PRSPs, partly because it is 
claimed that inflation generates regressive changes in income distribution.   
 
Other familiar first-generation reforms which re-appear in all PRSPs include measures 
to de-regulate  the financial sector:  movement towards market-based interest rates, 
liberalising the domestic banking sector and the elimination of exchange controls and 
opening up of the capital account (see Table 2).   Yet the connection between these 
policies and poverty reduction is remote, particularly in the context of poor countries 
with thin capital markets.  Nevertheless, poverty reduction strategies in all Africa 
PRSPs continue to adhere to these principles. 
 
Trade policy advice in poverty reduction strategy programmes conforms to the  view 
that maintaining rapid integration into the world economy is the best way to combat 
poverty.  In every country, there is commitment to maintaining open and liberal 
trading regimes.  Some countries’ strategies emphasise export promotion and 
diversification, although there is little indication of how this is to be achieved (e.g., 
Tanzania).  A very few cases diverge somewhat from the conventional wisdom.  
Mozambique’s PRSP, for example, advocates the use of ‘case-by-case, selective 
intervention, limited in time’ for manufactured goods (p.76).   
 
There is also universal emphasis on the continued privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, reliance on private agents in the provision of public goods, the 
liberalisation of prices for most utilities and key markets; cost-recovery in curative 
healthcare and secondary/tertiary education; and a general reduction of state 
involvement in the economy (see Table 2). The PRSPs also endorse the second 
generation reforms, including institutional reform, such as  anti-corruption measures; 
more participatory and accountable public administration with attendant reforms in 
the civil service; transparency in the preparation and monitoring of budgetary 
expenditures; and legal reforms aiming at securing property rights and strengthening 
institutions that affect private sector activity, as well improving the rule of law.   
 
The purpose here is not to discuss whether the structural strategies pursued in PRSPs 
are always the most appropriate for combating poverty, but, rather, to highlight the 
similarity of the policy package contained in PRSPs  across countries, and to earlier QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 23 
 
structural adjustment programmes. Although the emphasis on various reforms differs 
in different country contexts –  for example, transition countries (e.g., Azerbaijan, 
Albania and Tajikstan) tend to emphasise privatisation reforms more than others – the 
fact remains all countries documents pursue the same core set of structural reforms.  
These trends suggest low national control over final documents.  
 
The lack of explicit linkages between macro-economic policies and poverty reduction 
goals also suggests that these reforms have not been substantially affected by the 
PRSP process. .  In every country document, poverty analysis and the macro-
economic strategies are presented as two independent sections of the PRSP, with the 
macro sections largely void of any ex-ante assessments of the impact of structural 
reforms on poverty apart from considerations of how various growth scenarios will 
impact poverty levels in the future (see Table 3).  Only Cambodia’s PRSP, and to a 
lesser extent that of Rwanda, recognise the potential negative impact of various 
reforms on poverty and the need to conduct qualitative assessments of their possible 
effects.
 16  Nor is there any substantive discussion of the possible trade-offs involved 
with various policies.  Moreover, several country papers (e.g., Albania, Nicaragua and 
Senegal) exhibit internal inconsistencies, mentioning the failure of adjustment 
programmes in the past, but going on to advocate the very same policies in the macro 
section.  This together with the separation of the two parts of the documents and the 
lack of ex ante assessments of poverty consequences of macro-measures, lends 
support to the view that on the macro side, PRSPs basically endorse the conventional 
IFI-designed programmes.  
                                                 
16 The PRSP sourcebook states that poverty social assessment should be taken for major reforms, but as 
of yet very few have been undertaken.   QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 24 
 






































































































Links between growth and poverty reduction  x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x   x  x  x       x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Links between Poverty and Trade Policy         x                                 x 
Links between Poverty and Monetary Policy                              x           
Links between Poverty and Tax Policies/Fiscal Reform   x                                      
Links between Poverty and Privatisation                    x           x           x 
Links between Poverty and Legal/Judicial Reforms         x                                 
Links between Poverty and Civil Service Reforms         x                                 
Links between Poverty and Financial Sector Reforms         x                                 
Assessment of Past Policies  x              x  x  x       x     x       x 
Discussion of policy trade-offs                                          
Poverty Impact Evaluation         x                     x           





Of course, the issue of who determines policy design is difficult to assess definitively, 
especially without detailed anthropological work, and the possibility exists that some 
governments have chosen policies that conform to earlier packages because they 
genuinely believe them to be the most effective in reducing poverty.  Hence it is 
difficult to be certain that the counterfactual would prevail – i.e., if governments 
genuinely gained greater control their policies would have looked different.  But the 
fact that so little variation in macro policies exists across an extremely broad range of 
countries, and that country programmes are conditional on IFI endorsement before 
qualifying for new lending, strongly suggests that governments were not empowered 
to any great degree in policy making.  The lack of a coherent structure relating macro-
policies to poverty reduction goals, and the minimal impact of participation on 
policies further support the view that governments’ independence was greatly 
constrained.   
 
VI.  Ownership in the Wider Context of IFI Decision Making 
 
PRSPs  constitute only one of the programmes through which IFIs disburse funds.  At 
this time it does not seem that the other lending instruments offer anything significant 
in the way of empowering national decision making. 
 
The Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) continues to play an important role in 
overall lending to countries.  Administered solely by the IMF, they are credits to 
support monetary policy and fiscal reform.  Although they are supposed to be based 
on the PRSP and to integrate poverty reduction with macro-economic policies, and 
the IMF states PRGFs should be ‘open for public discussion’ (IMF 2002a), they do 
not stipulate either participation or ownership as part of their requirements.  In 
practice, it appears that little has changed in the style of negotiations – non-
transparent and confined to a small number of policy actors – or in substance, with a 
close resemblance to ESAFs (see Adam and Bevan, 2001; Killick 2002).   
 
While in theory PRGFs are meant to be based upon PRSPs, it appears in many cases 
the reverse is true (which may help to explain the lack of coherence between macro-
policies and poverty goals).  The majority of countries have negotiated PRGFs before 
formulating a PRSP, and in a number of cases, PRSP endorsement has been 
postponed as a result of countries’ missing targets under PRGF agreements.  In 
Kenya, the government negotiated a PRGF with some of the most restrictive set of 
conditionalities in its lending history just before finalising its PRSP (Hanmer et al. 
2003, p. 184).  In others (e.g., Bolivia, Ghana and Nicaragua) the targets set out in the 
PRGFs have gone on to form the bases for macro-economic benchmarks and 
performance targets (ICFTU 2002; Trocaire 2002).  Thus, rather than supporting the 
PRSP, the PRGF appears to be taking the more dominant role in many cases, with 
macro-economic targets influencing poverty requirements rather than vice versa.
17 
 
The number of structural conditions in PRGFs has, however, been reduced (so far by 
about  a quarter) in a streamlining exercise, although this has been very variable, with 
                                                 
17 Indeed, in connection with a recent review of PRGF experiences, the Fund itself admitted a tendency 
in this direction, from PRGF to PRSP (see IMF review in IMF 2002c). QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 26 
 
large reductions in some programmes and no change in others (Adam and Bevan 
2001).  But while detailed structural conditionality appears to be diminishing, there 
has simultaneously been more emphasis given to governance and public expenditure 
management (e.g. in Kenya, Killick 2002). Whether or not  conditionalities outside 
the ‘core areas’ are being reduced in PRGFs is ambiguous. For example, Killick 
reports they have actually gone up in Zambia
18, and similarly, a November 2001 
stand-by agreement with Romania still included conditions on domestic energy prices, 
privatisation, and restructuring of state-owned enterprises (Randel and German 2002).   
One concern is whether the conditionality  being relinquished by the Fund through its 
streamlining exercise will be taken up by the Bank and bilateral donors.  There seems 
to be no official counterpart effort by the Bank to narrow the scope of its 
conditionality, leading to the possibility, already backed up by some evidence, that 
those conditionalities dropped by the Fund will resurface in World Bank credits, 
resulting in little net reduction.  According to a Fund staff report on initial experiences 
with streamlining (quoted in Killick 2002 p. 19), the Bank is ‘strengthening’ its 
conditionality in areas such as privatisation, health system reform and public sector 
reform, from which the Fund is scaling back.   
 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PRSCs) are another lending instrument through 
which IFI conditionality may be imposed.  Designed to provide budget support for 
countries to implement their PRSPs, the PRSC allows the Bank to attach extra 
conditions to countries’ poverty reduction strategies through the Letter of 
Development Policy (LoDP) that accompanies it.  The LoDP is not a public 
document, and as such extra policy details are not ordinarily available for public 
discussion.  The few PRSCs that have been disbursed so far (Burkina Faso, Vietnam, 
Uganda) have allowed the World Bank to modify components of countries’ PRSP, 
making them differ little from conventional structural adjustment programmes 
(Eurodad 2001; Killick 2002). Paradoxically, this ‘back-door’ policy specification 
undermines the principle of ownership PRSCs are meant to help operationalise.   
 
Thus, although the Bank and Fund have adopted ownership as one of the pillars of the 
CDF, much of the lending outside PRSPs  allows the IFIs to exert considerable policy 




The limited experience with PRSPs so far would suggest that PRSPs have achieved 
little in the way of increasing national ownership/empowerment over programme 
design by national governments or civil society, though the process is still  at an early 
stage.   
 
This is not to say, however, that the PRSP exercise has had no impact on  the balance 
of power among stakeholders. In some very limited respects, civil society participants 
have been empowered compared to their earlier position by being formally included 
in the policy-making process.  But while this inclusion has been quite ‘wide’ in some 
instances, involving broad sections of civil society, it has not made much difference, 
as participation in most countries has been ‘shallow’, limited to consultation rather 
than joint decision-making.  Consequently, PRSPs have done little to empower civil 
                                                 
18 Killick (2002) , p5.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 27 
 
society; and the evidence above suggests that where civil society has been 
empowered, it is often an assortment of NGOs (including foreign ones), not 
necessarily representative of society as a whole, or of the poor in particular. 
 
National governments appear to be playing a more prominent role in policy 
formation, by formally taking charge of the policy-making agenda.  However, how far 
this has been empowering is doubtful.  The similarity of the programmes to those that 
form part of the normal international agenda suggests this is more window dressing 
than empowerment even with respect to the sectoral or micro agenda, except in a few, 
usually marginal, instances. When it comes to macro-policies, it appears that there is 
no national empowerment through the PRSP process, beyond the (usually limited) 
national contribution to the formulation of macro-programmes that already exists.  
Moreover, government capacity, which generally was already weak, has been 
stretched even further with the need to undertake formal consultations and to develop 
lengthy policy papers.  
 
Governments have also been constrained to involve more stakeholders in the policy 
process.   Indeed, a cynical reading would see the exercise as weakening the 
legitimacy of national governments by engaging with groups other than governments 
in designing policy (e.g., Summers 2001).  This criticism is particularly telling in the 
case of  democratically elected governments. The insistence on civil society 
participation by the IFIs by-passes existing institutions and can potentially weaken 
elected governments. In non-democratic regimes, however,  the situation is different 
and broadening participation may be particularly beneficial, contributing to the 
democratisation of decision-making. Of course, most political systems in very poor 
countries are in the process of democratisation – and a widening of consultation and 
strengthening of civil society may contribute to this process.  
 
Donors’ power, in contrast, while seemingly weakened by the relinquishment of 
policy design to national authorities and civil society participants, may not have 
actually declined at all significantly.  The ultimate endorsement of PRSPs still lies 
with the Boards of the two institutions, which conditions the dynamics of the process 
from the start. IFIs exert a considerable indirect influence, as we have discussed in 
incidences of self-censorship in government design of policies.  Moreover, the 
continued existence of many multilateral programmes outside the PRSP process and 
unaffected by it, still leaves the IFIs considerable control.  Thus, the relative position 
of donors has not changed much through the PRSP process, and may even have been 
strengthened to a degree by the veneer of legitimacy and perceptions of ownership 
that participation lends to the multilateral lending programmes.  
 
On balance, then, it would appear that civil society has been marginally strengthened 
by PRSPs, the position of national governments may have been somewhat weakened 
through this, while  the position of donors is broadly unchanged.  This conclusion is 
context dependent. Relatively strong governments may be able to use the process to 
their advantage. But nowhere has the PRSP produced a major change in the balance 
of power.  
 
To sum up, the PRSP process to date has not empowered developing countries and 
disempowered the World Bank. It may have changed perceptions and consequently 
national ownership from this perspective. If so it would appear to have actually helped QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS108  Page 28 
 
empower the World Bank, by increasing the effectiveness of programmes through 
raising national enthusiasm for them and increasing the perception they are home-
grown strategies. But this effect is likely to be short-lived unless control over 
programmes genuinely changes, because eventually perceptions tend to reflect reality. 
 
The evidence assessed thus far is based on only a few years experience.  The PRSP 
process is still evolving and following reviews of countries’ PRSP experiences  by the 
Bank and Fund in January 2002, both institutions have recognised many of the 
problems highlighted above regarding process and content. The process may be 
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